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Why Judicial Deference to Administrative Fact-
Finding is Unconstitutional 
Representative government and trial by jury are the heart and lungs 
of liberty. Without them we have no other fortification against being 
ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep, worked like cattle, and fed and 
clothed like swine and hounds. 
John Adams1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are currently 1,792 federal administrative law judges 
(ALJs),2 but the five ALJs employed by the Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC) have received more attention in the last five years 
than the other 1,787 combined. The SEC has been widely attacked 
for implementing what critics perceive as a strategy to prevent Article 
III judges from adjudicating SEC enforcement actions and put as 
many enforcement actions as possible in front of the SEC’s 
own judges.3 
The Dodd-Frank Act made this possible. In reaction to the 
excesses of the financial sector that led to that crisis, Congress in 2010 
passed a significant package of financial accountability and regulatory 
reforms, titled the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act.4 One such reform granted the SEC increased 
authority to bring enforcement actions before its own ALJs rather 
than Article III judges.5 
Both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times have since 
concluded that post-Dodd-Frank enforcement actions heard by SEC 
 
 1. Alan B. Bookman, We the People, 80 FLA. B.J. 6, 6 (2006). 
 2. Office of Personnel Management, ALJs by Agency, OPM.GOV (last updated Mar. 2016), 
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency. 
 3. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 21, 2014 9:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-
judges-it-appoints-1413849590. 
 4. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (Jul. 21, 2010). 
 5. See, e.g., Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor and Judge, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014 
7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge-
1407195362 (“[T]he 2010 Dodd-Frank law vastly expanded SEC discretion to charge 
wrongdoers administratively.”). 
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ALJs are systemically biased against defendants.6 For example, SEC 
ALJs find against defendants between eighty and ninety percent of the 
time, whereas federal district court judges find against defendants in 
only sixty-three to sixty-nine percent of SEC enforcement cases.7 
Furthermore, when the ALJ decisions are appealed to the SEC 
commissioners, “[t]he commissioners decided in their own agency’s 
favor concerning 53 out of 56 defendants in appeals—or 95%—from 
January 2010 through this past March [2015].”8 As the ALJs have 
heard more cases, the SEC has taken longer to decide appeals of ALJ 
decisions.9 The icing on the cake is that SEC officials are choosing to 
initiate proceedings before SEC ALJs, rather than before federal 
district court judges, with increasing frequency; in 2014, the SEC 
initiated eighty percent of its enforcement actions before ALJs rather 
than federal district court judges.10 
 
 6. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803; Gretchen 
Morgenson, At the S.E.C., a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at BU.1 
(“The administrative forums also restrict defendants’ abilities to take depositions, obtain 
documents from the government’s witnesses and conduct other discovery. The appeals process 
is similarly narrow; defendants seeking a reversal must first go to the commission itself. If 
unsuccessful there, they must go to a circuit court of appeals, which is typically hesitant to 
question administrative law judges’ findings as they are considered experts in their areas, Mr. 
Riccio [a professor and former dean of Seton Hall Law School] says. The S.E.C. says successful 
appeals have been rare.”) 
 7. Eaglesham, supra note 6 (“The SEC says its judges are impartial and the process is 
fair. It attributes the difference in outcomes partly to case mix. For instance, most of its 
complicated insider-trading cases have been heard in federal court, not by its in-house judges.”); 
see also Morgenson, supra note 6. Empirical evidence does support the SEC’s position; 
specifically, Adam Pritchard and Stephen Choi found that the SEC does indeed send its most 
complex cases to the federal district court, while retaining the so-called “easy cases” for 
resolution by ALJ. Adam C. Pritchard & Stephen Choi, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative 
Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 
(Working Paper No. 119, 2016), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/119; see 
also David Zaring, S.E.C.’s In-House Judges Not Too Tough, A Review Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/business/dealbook/secs-in-house-
judges-not-too-tough-a-review-shows.html. 
 8. Eaglesham, supra note 6. 
 9. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Appeals Process on the Slow Track, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2015, 
7:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-appeals-process-on-the-slow-track-1450743130. 
 10. Eaglesham, supra note 6 (“‘It is a fundamental change,’ said Joseph Grundfest, a 
former SEC commissioner who is now a law professor at Stanford University. ‘By bringing more 
cases in its own backyard, the agency is not only increasing its chances of winning but giving 
itself greater control over the future evolution of legal doctrine.’”). 
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 One New York City securities attorney observed: “I’ve been 
involved in these administrative proceedings for many years and have 
been struck by the unfairness and lack of neutrality in the system. . . . 
The judge’s mind-set reflects the agenda of the agency, which in this 
arena is enforcement.”11 Even in the absence of hard evidence of actual 
bias, Professor Ronald J. Riccio has observed, “If you get caught up 
in the web of an agency investigation, you’re investigated, prosecuted, 
and judged by agency personnel. . . . Even if it doesn’t create actual 
bias, it doesn’t look good.”12 
Several prominent businesspeople targeted by the SEC have 
challenged the ALJs and their dramatically expanded caseloads on 
constitutional grounds, with varying degrees of success.13 For 
example, Mark Cuban, the owner of the Dallas Mavericks and an 
acquitted former SEC defendant, has been an outspoken opponent of 
the SEC’s litigation “home-court advantage” for years.14 This past 
year, Lynn Tilton, an investment executive known for rescuing 
struggling start-ups, joined the opposition when the SEC brought an 
 
 11. Morgenson, supra note 6; see also Eaglesham, supra note 6 (“One former SEC judge 
said she thought the system was slanted against defendants at times. Lillian McEwen, who was 
an SEC judge from 1995 to 2007, said she came under fire from Ms. [Brenda] Murray [the 
SEC’s chief ALJ] for finding too often in favor of defendants. ‘She questioned my loyalty to the 
SEC,’ Ms. McEwen said in an interview, adding that she retired as a result of the criticism. Ms. 
McEwen said the SEC in-house judges were expected to work on the assumption that ‘the 
burden was on the people who were accused to show that they didn’t do what the agency said 
they did.’”); Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May 
24, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-of-
government/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7z1_story.html (“[A]gency 
proceedings are often mockeries of due process, with one-sided presumptions and procedural 
rules favoring the agency.”). 
 12. Morgenson, supra note 6. 
 13. See, e.g., Raymond J. Lucia Companies v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191 
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016); Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824 
F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016); Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357, 2015 WL 5547463 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
17, 2015); Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15–CV–2106–LMM, 2015 WL 7597428 (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 4, 2015). 
 14. See Todd Davis, Mark Cuban Takes His Grudge Against the SEC to the Supreme 
Court, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Mar. 16, 2016, 6:09 PM), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/business-headlines/20160316-mark-cuban-takes-
his-grudge-against-the-sec-to-the-supreme-court.ece; Jean Eaglesham, Mark Cuban Latest 
Fight With SEC: In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2015, 4:13 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/09/15/mark-cuban-latest-fight-with-sec-in-
house-judges/. 
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enforcement action against her firm, Patriarch Partners.15 Because of 
this widespread backlash, the SEC “quietly pulled back on its use of 
in-house judges,”16 and modified its procedural rules to allow for more 
discovery during ALJ adjudications.17 However, to the extent that the 
real issues with ALJ adjudications are constitutional rather than 
political, these reforms fall short.18 
Criticisms of the administrative state that focus on separation-of-
powers or Appointments Clause issues19 overlook another 
fundamental constitutional question: Does (1) granting ALJs the 
power to conduct jury-less fact-finding in what are essentially civil 
actions, or (2) deferring to that fact-finding on appeal, violate the 
Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution 
provides: “In suits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved . . . .”20 Under the Supreme Court’s “historical test,” any 
 
 15. See Jonathan Stempel, Lynn Tilton Sues SEC Again, Calls Cases Unconstitutional, 
REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2016, 9:53 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-sec-tilton-
idUKKCN11F2JX; Alison Frankel, Distressed Debt Diva Lynn Tilton on ‘Unfair’ SEC Trial: ‘You 
Don’t Believe It Could Happen’, REUTERS (July 27, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2016/07/27/distressed-debt-diva-lynn-tilton-on-unfair-sec-trial-you-dont-believe-it-
could-happen/. 
 16. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015, 9:00 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-1444611604. 
 17. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Gives Ground on Judges, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2015, 8:03 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gives-ground-on-judges-1443139425; Mark Schoeff, Jr., 
SEC Approves Reforms to In-House Process for Enforcement Cases, INV. NEWS (July 13, 2016, 
12:47 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160713/FREE/160719966?t
emplate=printart (“Parties will now have more time to prepare for a hearing and to be able to 
take depositions, but concerns of fairness remain.”). 
 18. See Joseph Quincy Patterson, Many Key Issues Still Left Unaddressed in the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s Attempt to Modernize Its Rules of Practice, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1675 (April 2016); Eaglesham, supra note 17 (“Some critics say the changes don’t go far 
enough.”); Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Finds Itself in a Constitutional Conundrum, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/business/dealbook/sec-finds-itself-
in-a-constitutional-conundrum.html; Suja A. Thomas & Mark Cuban, A Jury, Not the S.E.C., 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/17/business/dealbook/a-
jury-not-the-sec.html; Jean Eaglesham, SEC Faces ‘Crisis of Confidence’ Over In-House Court, 
Ex-Official Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015, 3:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-faces-
crisis-of-confidence-over-in-house-court-ex-officials-says-1449089157. 
 19.  See, e.g, Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Finds Itself in a Constitutional Conundrum, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (June 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/business/
dealbook/sec-finds-itself-in-a-constitutional-conundrum.html (describing recent constitutional 
challenges to SEC’s enforcement actions); Jonathan Stempel, SEC beats new challenge to in-house 
judges in Atlanta federal court, REUTERS (June 17, 2016, 6:18 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-sec-court-proceedings-idUSKCN0Z32K6 (same). 
 20.  U.S. CONST. amend VII. 
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issue that a jury would have heard under 1789 English common law 
must be heard by a jury today;21 civil enforcement actions fall in this 
category. Furthermore, even under an alternative historical 
approach—based on the Framers’ original intent—in-house 
enforcement actions, and judicial deference to administrative fact-
finding, fail the Seventh Amendment. 
Part II will discuss the historical roots of the Seventh Amendment 
and the development of the Supreme Court’s feeble Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence. Part III will discuss Suja Thomas’s work 
on the unconstitutionality of summary judgment, upon which this 
Comment is modeled. Part IV argues that in-house enforcement 
actions without civil juries, and judicial deference to administrative 
fact-finding, are unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment’s 
historical test, as well as unconstitutional under the alternate 
“legislative history” approach to the Seventh Amendment. Because 
fact-finding by SEC ALJs is unconstitutional under either 
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, our country must take 
steps to either reconcile the Seventh Amendment with current 
administrative practice, or vice versa. The best answer would be to 
require the SEC to bring its enforcement actions in federal district 
court in the first instance. Although that change would create practical 
and logistical problems, which Congress would need to address, that 
process is most consistent with the original intent of the 
Seventh Amendment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  Passage of the Seventh Amendment 
When the Continental Congress issued the Declaration of 
Independence on July 4, 1776, its members elected to include in that 
document a specific list of grievances they had against King George 
III’s administration in the American colonies. Between the more 
obvious violations of human dignity named in that document—
“[P]rotecting [royal troops], by a mock Trial, from punishment for 
any Murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these 
States,” “[R]avag[ing] our Coasts, burn[ing] our towns, and 
 
 21.  See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 139, 147 (2007). 
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destroy[ing] the lives of our people,” and forcing Americans captured 
at sea “to bear Arms against their Country, to become the 
executioners of their friends and Brethren”22—the American colonists 
expressed their outrage at King George III “[f]or depriving us in many 
cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.”23 
Perhaps in our day it is surprising to see that the Framers so 
revered the right to “Trial by Jury” that they were willing to publicly 
condemn their king for depriving them of that right, framing it as part 
of “a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct 
object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny.”24 Yet this was exactly 
the tenor of the colonists’ feelings regarding this right: they viewed it 
as a sacrosanct bulwark against the tyranny of the King’s judges.25 In 
a period when tensions were beginning to develop between the King 
and his American subjects, it was common for royal judges to suspend 
jury trials and hear cases themselves.26 This deprived the American 
colonists of the opportunity to inject their perspective into the 
outcome of the case. On the other hand, when colonial juries were 
allowed in court proceedings, the colonists invariably used the 
opportunity to protest by nullifying the King’s allegedly oppressive 
laws.27 So it was that 
[i]n the 1770s, the jury emerged as a symbol of the struggle for 
independence. Its reputation as a defender of liberty meant that it was 
destined to occupy a prominent place in the creation of the new state 
governments. Indeed, the attachment to the jury was such that every 
state constitution guaranteed the right to trial by jury in both civil 
and criminal cases.28 
 
 22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 17, 26, 28 (U.S. 1776). 
 23. Id. at para. 20; see Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, 
the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 148−49 (1991). 
As shown below, this refers to both criminal juries and civil juries. 
 24. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 25. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 148–49. 
 26. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 145, 164−67 (2001). 
 27. See id. at 159−68. 
 28. Id. at 168 (emphasis added); see Scheiner, supra note 23, at 149 (“During the later 
ratification debate, Antifederalists held that one of the goals of the Revolution had been to win 
back the civil jury trial right.”); see also Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the 
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 655 (1972) (“In fact, ‘[t]he right to trial by jury 
was probably the only one universally secured by the first American state constitutions . . . .’ The 
attachment to this form of trial was so strong that it was even prescribed to be used in prize cases 
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When the Constitutional Convention met in the hot summer of 
1787 to draft a new framework for the paralyzed new Confederacy, 
the members of that Convention chose to lay out the scheme for a 
national government stronger than what had existed under the 
Articles of Confederation.29 This new federal government, which 
would share sovereignty with the state governments in a novel “federal 
system,” would consist of a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary.30 
Yet the new Constitution did not mention any claim to jury trial for 
litigants under the proposed new government—rather, the proposal 
had been briefly considered and then set aside.31 
This seemingly minor omission was a major stumbling block 
during the Constitution’s ratification process—a weakness that the 
Antifederalists latched onto in their opposition to the new 
Constitution.32 Indeed, “[e]ven before the Philadelphia Convention 
adjourned, plans were being laid to attack the Constitution that was 
eventually proposed because of the absence of any guarantee of civil jury 
trial in the new federal courts.”33 Some even went so far as to suggest 
that the omission of explicit mention of the jury trial right in the 
Constitutional text was part of an insidious Federalist plot to 
surreptitiously smother the jury trial right altogether.34 That Alexander 
 
that were triable to the only central judicial authority created by the states under the Articles of 
Confederation.”), quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1963 reprint) and citing ART. OF 
CONFEDERATION, art. IX, in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 12–15 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). 
 29. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, 1783–1789 (2015). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Wolfram, supra note 28, at 656−60. Ironically, part of the reason the Constitutional 
Convention didn’t further consider a civil jury trial guarantee was because they believed it would 
be too difficult to specify which cases were entitled to civil jury trials, and which cases were not. 
Id. at 663−64. 
 32. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 146, n.23 (“The civil jury trial right was the first right that 
participants in the convention found missing from the new Constitution.”), citing Wolfram, 
supra note 28, at 658−59; Harrington, supra note 26, at 184−85 (“It is . . . important to note 
that antifederalist support for the civil jury was far more substantive than an argument that civil 
juries were merely ‘a good thing.’”). The civil jury trial right was the first right that participants 
in the convention found missing from the new Constitution. Id. 
 33. Wolfram, supra note 28, at 662 (emphasis added). 
 34. Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to 
Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 412 (1999) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998)) (“[T]he Antifederalists charged that this 
omission was part of a Federalist conspiracy against civil juries, which had silently been banished 
4.GIBBONS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2017  11:57 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1494 
Hamilton—who had no significant personal attachment to civil 
juries—devoted his Federalist No. 83 solely to explaining why the 
Constitution did not mention any right to a jury trial, and assuring 
early Americans that the jury trial was not in danger, provides strong 
evidence of the importance of the civil jury in its day.35 
Eventually, the Federalists were able to secure the needed state 
approvals for ratification only by promising36 that the first priority of 
the new federal government would be to draft and put into effect a 
Bill of Rights, which would inevitably include the civil jury trial right.37 
When the first Congress convened in 1789, James Madison made 
good on this promise by introducing resolutions in the House of 
Representatives to amend the Constitution to include guarantees of 
individual rights.38 Madison’s proposed amendments would be the 
constitutional progenitors of what today is known as the Bill of Rights. 
The original proposed language of the Seventh Amendment was: “In 
 
from the federal courts.”); see also Brandon L. Boxler, Judicial Gatekeeping and the Seventh 
Amendment: How Daubert Infringes Upon the Constitution Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 14 RICH. 
J. OF L. & PUB. INT., no. 3, 2011, at 483 (“Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, and George Mason 
rallied opposition to the Constitution ‘by asserting that [it] would abolish civil 
juries altogether.’”). 
 35. It was no secret that Alexander Hamilton, one of the chief proponents of the newly 
drafted Constitution, was not as ideologically attached to the jury trial right as others among the 
Framers. See Scheiner, supra note 23, at 146 n.21 (“Although Hamilton opposed the civil jury, 
he recognized that some viewed it as the ‘very palladium of free government.’”); Harrington, 
supra note 26, at 184; id. at 147 n.23 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 495 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)) (“The objection to the plan of the convention, which has 
met with the most success in [New York], and perhaps in several of the other States, is that 
relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil cases.”). 
 36. Wolfram, supra note 28, at 656 (“Ratification was ultimately achieved probably only 
on the strength of assurances that the basic protections of a bill of rights would be incorporated 
as amendments (or enacted as statutes, according to some assurances) at the first meeting of the 
Congress provided for under the Constitution.”); see also id. at 672 (“[O]n the matter of civil 
jury trial[, if not on the matter of the Constitution’s ratification generally,] the antifederalists 
won. . . . [T]he antifederalist arguments concerning civil jury trial . . . ultimately prevailed.”). 
Indeed, “[t]he antifederalist pressure did not relent after the Constitution was finally adopted,” 
and “[m]any federalist candidates for elective office in the new federal government, such as 
Madison, had to promise constituents that a bill of rights would promptly be made a part of the 
Constitution by amendment.” Id. at 725. 
 37. Of course, there were numerous civil rights embodied in the Bill of Rights that were 
important in the ratification debate as well. Nevertheless, the civil jury trial right played a special 
role. See Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil 
Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1010 (1992) (at the time of the Constitution’s ratification, 
“[t]he only disagreement seem[ed] to be over whether civil jury rights were the most important 
of all individual rights, or simply one of the most important rights”). 
 38. Klein, supra note 37, at 1018–20. 
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suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one 
of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to 
remain inviolate.”39 
After sparse debate and revision40 (about which little is known41), 
this guarantee was eventually adopted in the form that we know today: 
“In Suits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined 
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.”42 
With the benefit of more than two hundred years of hindsight, it 
is safe to say that the general attitude of indifference toward the civil 
jury right today, both among average Americans43 and among the legal 
community,44 has drifted significantly from the Framers’ treatment of 
 
 39. Krauss, supra note 34, at 428 (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 493 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (quoting Proposal 
by Madison in House (Jun. 8, 1789))). 
 40. Most importantly to the purposes of this Comment, the phrase “between man and 
man” was eliminated from the final version of the amendment. 
 41. Harrington, supra note 26, at 212 (“There is little direct legislative history 
surrounding the passage of the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury in 
civil cases—or indeed, of any of the amendments proposed in the House by James Madison. 
What is clear is that the jury trial right, like other proposed amendments, was designed to allay 
the fears of those who believed that the Constitution did not contain adequate protections for 
individual liberty.”). 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 43. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 147 (“Today the seventh amendment stands emptied of 
the political and moral content necessary to sustain it as a constitutional principle.”); see, 
e.g., Dan Rodricks, Jury duty and the inconvenience of being a citizen, BALT. SUN (Apr. 6, 
2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-04-06/news/bs-md-rodricks-0407-
20130406_1_jury-duty-jury-pool-jury-selection; How to Get Out of Jury Duty, 
WIKIHOW, http://www.wikihow.com/Get-Out-of-Jury-Duty (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) 
(“While it is your duty to attend jury duty, there are some secrets to ‘getting out’ of it if it does 
not fit into your life at the moment.”); Andrew Ferguson, What Every Harvard Law Student 
Should Know About Juries, HARV. L. REV. (Nov. 25, 2015), http://hlrecord.org/2015/11/
what-every-harvard-law-student-should-know-about-juries/ (“Juries are in crisis. The jury trial 
exists today unloved, neglected, and largely avoided in legal practice. Procedural barriers and 
civic apathy have combined to gut one of the central tenets of America’s constitutional 
structure.”); Alex Mayyasi, How A Lawsuit Over Hot Coffee Helped Erode the 7th Amendment, 
PRICEONOMICS (Oct. 3, 2016), http://priceonomics.com/how-a-lawsuit-over-hot-coffee-
helped-erode-the-7th/ (the famous Stella Liebeck ‘hot coffee lawsuit’ “is . . .  arguably[] part 
of a much larger story: the least publicized death of a constitutional right in the history of the 
United States—the right to a trial by jury”). 
 44. The Supreme Court has generally taken a narrow, formalistic view of the jury’s 
role in civil litigation . . . . This antiseptic conception of the jury’s purpose is 
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the Seventh Amendment, which “was flush with historical, political, 
and moral significance to the early Americans.”45 Indeed, at the time 
of the Constitution’s ratification,”[t]he only disagreement seem[ed] 
to be over whether civil jury rights were the most important of all 
individual rights, or simply one of the most important rights.”46 This 
decline in solicitude for the civil jury trial right has coincided with the 
erosion of that right,47 in part due to the rise of summary judgment in 
federal court proceedings, as well as the doctrine of judicial deference 
to administrative fact-finding, discussed below in Parts III and 
IV, respectively. 
B. Supreme Court’s Feeble Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court ostensibly claims to protect the civil jury trial 
right. The Court has said, for example, “[m]aintenance of the jury as 
a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place 
in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the 
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.”48 The 
actual trajectory of the federal courts’ preservation of this right has 
been far less exacting, and the courts have allowed the Seventh 
Amendment guarantee to be “curtail[ed]” significantly. This modern 
Seventh Amendment atrophy was precipitated by the Court’s 
adoption, in the early twentieth century, of a weak and insufficient test 
by which to assess Seventh Amendment claims. This frail test has 
repeatedly proven to be inadequate in preserving the civil jury trial 
right,49 and indeed has led to the current situation with SEC ALJs. 
 
inconsistent with the passion and violence with which the civil jury was defended 
during the Revolutionary era and the constitutional ratification debate. The civil jury 
trial provision was not a ‘technical amendment’ to the Constitution, but a crucial 
element in the political bargain that permitted ratification. 
 Scheiner, supra note 23, at 145−46. 
 45. Id. at 146. 
 46. Klein, supra note 37, at 1010. 
 47. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 166 (1973) (quoting Galloway v. United States, 
319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting)) (“Some . . . years ago, Mr. Justice Black 
warned his Brethren against the ‘gradual process of judicial erosion which . . . has slowly worn 
away a major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amendment.”). 
 48. Peter A. Arhangelsky, Note, Nullifying the Constitution: Federal Asbestos Tort Reform 
and the Abrogation of Seventh Amendment Rights, 98 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 98 (2006) 
(quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)). 
 49. See, e.g., Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional 
Rights to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811 (2013). 
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To analyze whether a specific procedure or district judge’s actions 
violate the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court declared that the 
“measuring-stick” is a historically-based test.50 At its foundations, the 
“historical test” requires the appellate court to decide only whether a 
jury would have been required to dispose of a certain claim under the 
common law of England as it stood in 1791.51 If a jury would have 
been required in 1791, the Seventh Amendment (presumably) 
requires a jury trial now.52 Of course, as we move increasingly further 
from the year 1791 with the passage of time, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to map modern disputes onto the English common law as it 
existed in 1791.53 
This is not the end of the analysis, however. The Supreme Court 
has further explained that the Seventh Amendment was meant to 
preserve only the “substance”54 of the civil jury trial right, not its 
“form”55 or incidents. Therefore, Congress, the executive, and the 
judiciary are free to alter those procedures and characteristics of the 
jury trial that fall outside of the sacred “substance.”56 A perverse twist 
in this constitutional calculus is that 
 
 50. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 51. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 
139, 147 (2007). 
 52. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 28, at 640 (“If a jury would have been impaneled in 
this kind of case in 1791 English practice, then generally a jury is required by the 
seventh  amendment.”). 
 53. See Mark I. Greenberg, The Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Courts and 
Administrative Agencies after Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 479, 483 
(1990) (“Today, however, discerning whether a particular action would, in eighteenth-century 
England, have come in the Chancery or the law courts can often prove difficult, as 
Granfinanciera illustrates. In that case, the majority looked primarily to old English case law 
and came to the conclusion that the Chancery court would have probably refused to hear an 
action for the recovery of a fraudulent conveyance. Justice White, in dissent, analyzed much of 
the same material and found the record inconclusive.”); Klein, supra note 37, at 1024. 
 54. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 51, at 147 (citing Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin 
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157−60 (1973)). 
 55. Id. (citing Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 498). 
 56. But see Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to 
a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 610−11 (1984) (“It is reasonable to assume that the 
framers foresaw an evolution of the common law and did not intend for the jury right to be lost 
as soon as any major judicial reform was implemented. Neither the language of the amendment, 
nor the available legislative history, however, supports the conclusion that the framers intended 
that the focus of an inquiry into the limits of the right to a civil jury be only on the “substantive” 
aspects of the trial, that is, the rights asserted and the remedies sought, and never on its 
procedural elements. Accepting that the seventh amendment’s explicit call for the “preservation” 
of rights existing at the time of ratification implied that a historical perspective is constitutionally 
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[t]he Court has [never] defined what constitutes the substance of 
the English common law jury trial in 1791. Instead the Court has 
individually compared various common law procedures to modern 
procedures. Under this approach, the Court has approved every 
procedure that it has considered that removes cases from juries, 
before, during, or after trials, even though such procedures did not 
exist under the English common law.57 
This means that, under the current historical test, the original 
“substance” of the civil jury trial right may hardly have been preserved 
at all. Rather, perhaps the Court has simply declined to demarcate the 
Seventh Amendment “substance” in order to be free to declare each 
challenged procedure only a modification to the incidentals of the 
common law jury trial. In this way, the Court can effectively mask 
what in reality are modifications of the undefined “substance.”58 
Ultimately, the historical test has proven unable to protect the 
Seventh Amendment against modern-day encroachment. The Seventh 
Amendment has, for whatever reason, been afforded significantly less 
vigorous judicial protection than other Constitutional rights. Federal 
courts have long seen themselves as guardians of these rights: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond 
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and 
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and 
 
required, there still remains a question as to whether, if one departs too far from the procedural 
aspects of jury trials as they were conducted in 1791, one can still be said to be preserving the 
right to jury trial.”). 
 57. Thomas, supra note 51, at 147; see also Paul B. Weiss, Comment, Reforming Tort 
Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 737, 737 (1988) 
(“To date, the United States Supreme Court has artfully avoided any pronouncement of what 
substantive jury functions are ‘preserved’ by the right to trial by jury in suits at common law, as 
guaranteed by the seventh amendment to the Constitution . . . . [T]he Court has yet to define 
in specific terms which substantive functions are so inherent to trial by jury, so elementary and 
necessary, that the seventh amendment preserves them from judicial or 
legislative  encroachment.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 49, at 811 (alteration in original) (“[B]oth state and 
federal court[s] . . . adopted originalist tests [to apply civil jury trial rights]. These tests, however, 
proved so flexible that they allowed legislatures and courts great discretion in modifying civil 
jury trial.”). 
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assembly, and other fundamental rights many not be submitted to 
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.59 
In this guardian role, federal courts have extended substantial 
protections to constitutional rights. Take, for example, the freedom of 
speech laid out in the First Amendment. Content-neutral regulations 
of speech (regulations, for example, of time, place and manner of 
speech, but not of content) are subject to intermediate (also called 
“heightened”) scrutiny review.60 To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, the 
speech regulation must be promulgated in response to a “substantial” 
government interest, “closely” tailored to accomplish that interest (in 
other words, the restriction does not apply to more speech than 
necessary), and preserve ample alternative avenues for the speaker to 
speak.61 This is a difficult constitutional standard for any statute 
to clear. 
Even more stringent is the strict-scrutiny standard of review, which 
is affectionately known among First Amendment scholars as “‘the kiss 
of death,’ because it is almost always fatal when applied”62 to a law 
challenged under the First Amendment. Strict scrutiny is applied to 
content-based regulations of speech—in other words, statutes that 
regulate speech based on the ideas presented by the speaker. Under 
strict scrutiny, the Court has invalidated laws that prevent convicted 
criminals from profiting off memoirs detailing their crimes,63 that 
prohibit state judicial candidates from expressing views on 
controversial political subjects,64 and that ban flag burning.65 
The Court does not stop “at the water’s edge” in protecting free 
speech rights, however, and has been more than willing to launch what 
are best described as pre-emptive attacks against free speech violations 
 
 59. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 60. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 
622  (1994). 
 61. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–28 (2010) (citing Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)). 
 62. P.J. Puryear, Life After NCRL v. Leake: Can North Carolina’s Disclosure Laws Survive 
a Constitutional Challenge?, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1252, 1259 (2009) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lecture by RonNell 
Anderson-Jones, BYU Law School (October 2015) (on file with author). 
 63. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105 (1991). 
 64. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 65. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397; United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
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under the chilling effect doctrine.66 Under the most common usage of 
the doctrine, “chilling effect refers to a concern that an otherwise 
legitimate rule will curb protected expression outside its ambit. This 
phenomenon generally arises when would-be speakers, faced with the 
uncertainties of the legal process, refrain from making protected 
statements.”67 In other words, the regulation at issue changes the 
incentives of the expression sufficiently for the would-be speaker to 
refrain from exercising a constitutional right. This means that the 
Supreme Court may invalidate “an otherwise legitimate law” based 
solely on the nebulous possibility that the law will cause some speaker, 
somewhere, to forgo exercising his or her constitutional right to 
speak.68 According to the Supreme Court, some constitutional rights 
even cast “penumbras” that create ancillary rights, strong enough 
themselves to void statutes for unconstitutionality.69 In short, the 
Court has provided formidable protection to other civil liberties. 
The Seventh Amendment civil jury right, on the other hand, 
enjoys no such protection. Under the historical test, procedures and 
regulations are merely examined to determine whether they infringe 
on the undefined “substance” of the Seventh Amendment, and if they 
do, they are invalidated. There is no required showing of a substantial 
(or even legitimate) governmental purpose for the regulation; there is 
no requirement that the regulation be narrowly tailored to serve the 
government’s interest. In fact, the “historical test” is even weaker in 
practice than it is in theory: “[T]he Supreme Court has upheld 
[against Seventh Amendment challenge] every new procedure that it 
has considered by which a court removes cases from the determination 
of a jury before, during, or after trial.”70 
Furthermore, there is no such thing as prophylactic protection for 
the Seventh Amendment, as there is for the freedom of speech under 
the chilling effect doctrine—even though the Seventh Amendment 
 
 66. For a general overview of the chilling effect doctrine, see Frederick Schauer, Fear, 
Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978). 
 67. Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 
1655 (2013) (emphasis omitted). 
 68. Id. at 1650. 
 69. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a 
contraceptive use law that “intrude[d] upon the right of marital privacy,” a penumbral right 
created by the First Amendment); id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); G. Sidney Buchanan, 
The Right of Privacy: Past, Present, and Future, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 403 (1989). 
 70. Thomas, supra note 51, at 142. 
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could sorely use such protection. For example, mandatory arbitration 
arguably alters citizens’ incentives enough to discourage would-be 
litigants from exercising their rights to jury trials at all.71 If there were 
the functional equivalent of a chilling effect doctrine in place to 
protect the “penumbra” of the Seventh Amendment, it would offer at 
least more protection (than the historical test) against possible civil 
jury right violations brought about, for example, by compelled 
arbitration 72 and summary judgment.73 
As discussed in Part III below, the Supreme Court has approved 
substantive changes in the modern-day role of the civil jury that 
arguably fail the historical test and certainly contradict the legislative 
history behind the Seventh Amendment’s enactment. Specifically, one 
of the great purposes of the jury trial was to prevent, or nullify, the 
actions of oppressive or biased legislatures, executives, and 
judiciaries.74 Therefore, whenever a judge or an administrative agency 
is allowed to act as fact-finder in civil suits in place of a jury, the 
Seventh Amendment is or should be offended under the historical test. 
III. “WHY SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL” 
Some have made similar Seventh Amendment arguments against, 
for example, summary judgment. According to Professor Suja 
Thomas, for example, the 1938 canonization of summary judgment 
proceedings in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure significantly (and 
unconstitutionally) displaced the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury 
right.75 Proponents of summary judgment, of course, claim that the 
procedure does not infringe on the jury trial right because it may only 
be invoked to end proceedings where “there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
 
 71. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the 
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001). 
 72. See Cory Tischbein, Animating the Seventh Amendment in Contemporary Plaintiffs’ 
Litigation: The Rule, or the Exception?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 233 (2013). 
 73. Thomas, supra note 51. 
 74. Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights 
to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811 (2013); Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s 
Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the 
Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2014) (“When 
America was founded, juries functioned differently—as an integral part of government in both 
England and the colonies.”). 
 75. Thomas, supra note 51. 
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of law.”76 Professor Thomas’ article served as a major influence on this 
Note, and deserves a short summary here. 
In analyzing a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, the 
Supreme Court has explained that there is a genuine dispute of 
material fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 
a verdict for the nonmoving party”;77 “the judge’s function is not 
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter 
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”78 
Additionally, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and 
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”79 However, even 
if there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the judge may “deny 
summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the 
better course would be to proceed to a full trial.”80 
Under these standards, then, the federal judge acts as a proxy jury 
in considering summary judgment. The judge effectively tries to step 
into the jury’s shoes and decide whether any reasonable jury could, 
based on the evidence produced, find for the nonmoving party.81 If 
the judge believes that there is no work for the jury to do, then the 
judge is able to grant the motion for summary judgment and avoid 
the difficulty and expense of conducting a civil jury trial.  
However, according to Professor Thomas, Rule 56 summary 
judgment does violate the Seventh Amendment historical test.82 
Professor Thomas begins by defining the “substance” of the civil jury 
right—an important analysis that the Supreme Court has yet to 
undertake. She identifies three important aspects of the civil jury trial’s 
role under the English common law, which represent “the substance,” 
or the “core principles” of the civil jury trial right at common law.83 
First, “the jury or the parties determined the facts.”84 This was 
accomplished either through a jury trial, or through the parties 
stipulating to a certain version of the facts; the judge “never decided 
 
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 77. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 78. Id. at 249. 
 79. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970), 
superseded on other grounds by Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). 
 80. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948)). 
 81. Thomas, supra note 51, at 145–46. 
 82. See generally Thomas, supra note 51. 
 83. Thomas, supra note 51, at 143. 
 84. Id. 
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the case without such a determination by the jury or the parties, 
however improbable the evidence might be.”85 Second, “only after the 
parties presented evidence at trial and only after a jury rendered a 
verdict, would a court ever determine whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support a jury verdict”; if the court so found, the court 
“would order a new trial.”86 Finally, “a jury would decide every case 
in which there was any evidence, however improbable the evidence 
was, unless the moving party admitted the facts and conclusions of the 
nonmoving party.”87 
Professor Thomas measures the Rule 56 summary judgment 
procedure against these three principles—which, if truly the substance 
of the common law civil jury right, must constitutionally be 
preserved—and concludes that summary judgment fails constitutional 
review by impermissibly modifying all three of these principles. First, 
she writes, summary judgment impermissibly infringes on the jury’s 
common law functions because “the court decides the case without a 
jury or the parties deciding the facts. The court assesses the evidence, 
decides what inferences from the evidence are reasonable, and decides 
whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.”88 The 
fact that judges considering summary judgment motions are directed 
to predict what a “reasonable jury” would find is a subtle indication 
to the careful thinker that summary judgment treads on territory into 
which the judge should not venture alone. 
Second, Thomas argues that summary judgment under Rule 56 is 
unconstitutional because the court weighs the sufficiency of the 
evidence the parties have presented before trial, rather than after, as at 
common law.89 Thomas’ third observation is that summary judgment 
allows a moving party to be granted judgment as a matter of law 
without admitting to the evidence and facts alleged by the nonmoving 
party.90 Whether or not judges believe they are “weighing evidence” 
in an impermissible manner, Rule 56 removes evidence determinations 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 160. 
 89. Thomas, supra note 51, at 160. 
 90. Id. 
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from the jury in a manner that did not—and could not—exist under 
the English common law.91 
Additionally, she dismisses the suggestions that summary 
judgment is just a modern form of common law procedures such as 
the demurrer to the pleadings,92 the demurrer to the evidence,93 the 
nonsuit,94 the special case,95 and the new trial,96 none of which 
modified the three principles that Professor Thomas identified as the 
substance of the common law. Overall, Professor Thomas’ piece 
analyzes the historical test’s contours with greater detail and depth 
than anything the Supreme Court has produced. 
Ultimately, Professor Bronsteen probably said it best when he 
wrote, “[s]ummary judgment might be a wonderful procedure were 
it not inefficient, unfair, and unconstitutional.”97 Unfortunately for 
the Seventh Amendment, summary judgment is not the only recent 
jurisprudential development that has narrowed the civil jury trial 
guarantee. This Comment next discusses the significant effect that 
chaining federal courts to administrative agencies’ fact-finding has had 
on the civil jury trial right. 
IV. WHY JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE FACT-
FINDING IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Another doctrine that deprives the civil jury of its constitutionally 
apportioned fact-finding function—and therefore violates the Seventh 
Amendment—is judicial deference to fact-finding by administrative 
adjudicatory proceedings.98 More and more, Congress creates 
 
 91. See, e.g., Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments Entered by 
the Federal Courts Has Eliminated the Jury from the Judicial Power, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 469, 469 
(2009) (citing D. Theodore Rave, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 875, 884 nn.57–58 (2006)) (“Today summary judgment is granted on issues of 
reasonableness, state of mind, and credibility, results that were [once] inconceivable.”).  
 92. Thomas, supra note 51, at 148–50. 
 93. Id. at 150–54. 
 94. Id. at 154–56. 
 95. Id. at 156–57. 
 96. Id. at 157–58. 
 97. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 
551  (2006). 
 98. See Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s 
Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1977) (“The decision of 
the Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission has 
seriously weakened the protection afforded by the seventh amendment to the United 
States Constitution.”). 
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administrative agencies to enforce various civil laws, write regulations, 
and administer penalties,99 as well as adjudicate disputes arising under 
those laws and regulations.100 Congress has also decided, in many cases 
where the administrative agencies’ decisions are subject to judicial 
review,101 that the factual findings of the administrative agencies will 
be given deference by—and therefore be effectively binding on—the 
federal court.102 There is no jury because all of the facts are effectively 
 
 99. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231 (1994). 
 100. “Administrative agencies currently adjudicate more disputes than federal courts.” 
David A. Brown, Note, Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative Agency Determinations: 
Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 817 (1988). 
Furthermore, “[i]n 2001, the U.S. government had 1,370 Administrative Law Judges (ALJs)—
more than twice the number of Article III judges . . . . Although it is unclear how many of these 
administrative proceedings are ‘trials’ in the traditional sense, what is clear is that more disputes 
are now being resolved outside our judicial system than inside it.” David J. Beck, The 
Consequences of the Vanishing Trial: Does Anyone Really Care?, 1 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF THE 
RECORD 29, 35–36 (2010) (emphasis in original). 
There are currently thirty-four federal agencies that use administrative law judges to adjudicate 
disputes under the civil laws the respective agencies are authorized to enforce: the Coast Guard, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the Department 
of Health and Human Services (Department Appeals Board and the Office of Medicare Hearings 
and Appeals), the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of the 
Interior, the Department of Justice (Executive Office for Immigration Review), the Department 
of Labor, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, the 
International Trade Commission, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the National Labor 
Relations Board, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the Office of Financial 
Institution Adjudication, the Patent and Trademark Office, the Postal Service, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Small Business Administration, and the Social Security 
Administration. Agencies Employing Administrative Law Judges, ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES, 
http://www.aalj.org/agencies-employing-administrative-law-judges (last visited Oct. 8, 2016). 
 101. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). However, some administrative fact-finding is not subject to 
judicial review in any form. See, e.g., Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Arising in Federal Court 
Appeals of ASCS Decisions Administering Federal Farm Programs, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 633, 
638–39 (1988) (pointing out that 7 U.S.C. § 1385 prohibits judicial review of certain 
Department of Agriculture determinations). 
 102. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside 
agency . . . findings . . . found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to 
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute . . . .”); Judah A. Shechter, Note, De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative 
Agency Factual Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 
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pre-determined by the administrative agency’s proceedings.103 
Through incremental doctrinal development, which culminated with 
the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA,104 
the Supreme Court has held that such deference does not violate the 
Seventh Amendment. However, as discussed below in Sections IV.A 
through IV.C, the Supreme Court decided this question incorrectly; 
judicial deference to administrative fact-finding—even when analyzed 
under the historical test’s malleable requirements, fails to pass 
constitutional muster and operates in direct contradiction to the 
Framers’ intent in passing the Seventh Amendment. 
A. The “Appellate Review Model” and the Supreme Court’s 
Misguided Approval 
The Supreme Court did not arrive at its Atlas Roofing holding 
overnight. Rather, Atlas Roofing was merely the most recent 
manifestation of a deeply embedded jurisprudential trend known as 
the “appellate review model of administrative law.”105 Criticism of 
these court decisions has largely centered on the separation-of-powers 
doctrine undergirding the constitutional structure.106 There has not 
 
1483 (1988) (“With the rise of the modern administrative state, . . . courts have ceded much 
ordinary fact-finding and law application to agencies, subject to only limited judicial review.”). 
 103. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (stating that in judicial review of decisions of the 
Occupational Safety & Health Commission, “[t]he findings of the Commission with respect to 
questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall 
be conclusive”). 
 104. 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
 105. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate 
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 943 (2011) (“[T]he appellate 
review model is so thoroughly embedded in contemporary administrative law that modern 
lawyers take it for granted.”). 
 106. Modern constitutional law scholars frequently suggest that the appellate review model 
of administrative law violates the plain meaning of Article III of the Constitution. They argue 
that Article III vests the “judicial power of the United States” exclusively in courts composed of 
judges who enjoy life tenure and secure compensation. The judicial power, it is further assumed, 
includes the power to find both the facts and the law needed to resolve particular cases and 
controversies. The appellate review model, however, calls for a sharing of this power with federal 
tribunals that do not have the independence of Article III courts. The appellate review model, 
from this perspective, represents a major challenge: Is there a principled justification for what 
appears to be a violation of the plain requirements of the Constitution? Id. at 979−80 
(citation omitted). 
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been, as yet, much serious discussion on the Seventh Amendment 
implications of the appellate review model.107 
The appellate review model sees the relationship between 
administrative agencies and the Article III judges who review their 
decisions as analogous to that which exists between trial court judges 
and appellate court judges. The administrative agency (like a trial 
court) is seen as entitled to deference on appeal with regard to certain 
decisions.108 Under this model, the administrative agency (like a trial 
court or trial jury) is more capable at making accurate factual findings, 
and therefore the reviewing court should give such findings deference 
and disturb them only if they are not based in 
“substantial evidence.”109 
Professor Thomas Merrill, a constitutional scholar at Columbia 
Law School, describes in depth the historical development of the 
appellate review model, tracing its origins far past the commonly 
accepted starting point of the doctrine110 (generally supposed to be the 
decision in Crowell v. Benson111). Indeed, “[r]ecovering the early 
history of the appellate review model allows us to understand why one 
of the most significant constitutional questions posed by the rise of 
the modern administrative state112 was never seriously deliberated by 
 
 107. Even in a seventy-page article discussing in great detail the doctrine that developed 
to prevent federal courts from reviewing administrative agencies’ factual findings in civil 
proceedings, Professor Merrill does not mention the Seventh Amendment once. Id. at 939. This 
is not a criticism of Professor Merrill; however, the idea that judicial deference to administrative 
fact-finding could be unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment is conspicuously absent 
from the cases that Professor Merrill discusses. The sole exception is Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 
22 (1932), where the Court summarily rejected the Seventh Amendment argument because the 
case at hand was a maritime case within the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, and therefore the 
Seventh Amendment did not apply. Id. at 45. Later cases, where the Seventh Amendment 
presumably should apply, do not raise this argument further. 
 108. Merrill, supra note 105, at 941 (“The reviewing court conceives of its role vis-à-vis 
the administrative agency in terms of the conventions that govern the appeals court-trial 
court relationship.”). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 943−44. 
 111. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 112. To Professor Merrill, these were questions raised by the doctrine of the separation-of-
powers. Even his very thorough seventy-page law review article on the development of the 
appellate review model fails to discuss the implications of the appellate review model for the civil 
jury trial right preserved by the Seventh Amendment. 
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the Supreme Court,” because that “model was adopted twenty years 
before the decision in Crowell.”113 
The appellate review model began at the creation of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887, “the first major national 
regulatory agency.”114 The ICC’s decisions and factual determinations 
were given little deference when reviewed by Article III federal courts 
under what was effectively de novo review.115 The ICC eventually 
buckled under the weight of the Supreme Court’s cavalierly non-
deferential review of ICC determinations. According to Stephen 
Skowronek, “[b]y 1896−97, the Court was openly declaring that it 
was not bound by the conclusions of the commission, that it could 
admit additional evidence, and that it could set aside the commission’s 
findings altogether,”116 and “[t]he Court’s aggressive review 
threatened to reduce the ICC to the status of ‘a mere statistics-
gathering agency.’”117 
Lest the country’s first foray into the promising world of 
administrative law be abandoned to ignominious defeat, Congress 
(after significant debate) passed the Hepburn Act,118 which granted 
the ICC additional power.119 Professor Merrill writes: 
From the perspective of the Supreme Court, the message encoded 
in the Hepburn Act was twofold. First, the public and the politicians 
were deeply unhappy with the Court’s existing practices regarding 
judicial review of ICC rate orders. Second, Congress and the 
President had provided no direction regarding what to do about it. 
The net effect was to delegate authority to the Court to decide on 
the new standard of review, with the implied threat that if the Court 
 
 113. Merrill, supra note 105, at 943−44. 
 114. Id. at 950. 
 115. Id. at 950−53 (“[T]he breadth of review of agency action in the nineteenth century 
varied, but the nature of the review was uniformly what we would now call de novo, certainly as 
to the development of the record. The understanding that courts would develop the record for 
review exerted a powerful pull on the standard of review, and so the tenor of review even in 
statutory review cases was nearly always one of independent judgment. There was little rhetoric 
of deference, and even less evidence of it in practice.”). 
 116. Merrill, supra note 105, at 953–54 (citing STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING 
A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920, 
at 154−55 (1982). 
 117. Merrill, supra note 105, at 954 (quoting SKOWRONEK, supra note 116, at 151). 
 118. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906). 
 119. Merrill, supra note 105, at 955−59. 
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did not back off from its aggressive review practices, more drastic 
action would be in the offing.120 
The Court did, in fact, “back off”; shortly thereafter, small 
glimpses of the appellate review doctrine began to show up in the 
Supreme Court’s opinions.121 For example, in Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,122 the Court 
“emphasiz[ed] the law-fact distinction familiar to judges from the 
conventions associated with judicial review of jury verdicts” and 
declined to intrude into the ICC’s factual findings at issue in the 
case.123 Additionally, in Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Railway Co. 
v. Interstate Commerce Commission,124 the Supreme Court established 
the “clear and unmistakable error” standard, “invoking the language 
used to review factual determinations of judges sitting without 
a jury.”125  
Finally, in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co.,126 “we witness the birth of the famous ‘substantial 
evidence’ standard of review of agency findings of fact. The standard 
was borrowed—without citation of authority—from the established 
understanding of the standard of review that an appeals court applies 
in reviewing a jury verdict.”127  In other words, the Supreme Court 
was putting the final touches on the appellate review model; a federal 
court reviewing administrative agency actions would review the 
agency’s factual findings under the same standard of review as if the 
findings had been made by a duly impaneled civil jury. The separation-
of-powers concerns about the doctrine were essentially ignored;128 the 
Court did not even feel the need to address the Seventh Amendment. 
 
 120. Id. at 959 (citations omitted). 
 121. Id. at 959−63. 
 122. 206 U.S. 441 (1907). 
 123. Merrill, supra note 105, at 960−61. 
 124. 206 U.S. 142 (1907). 
 125. Merrill, supra note 105, at 961. 
 126. 222 U.S. 541 (1912). 
 127. Merrill, supra note 105, at 961−62. 
 128. Merrill, supra note 105, at 972−79 (describing the scholarly work of John Dickinson 
in encouraging and ‘cheerleading’ the growth of the appellate review model, and noting that 
“Dickinson’s indifference to the Article III implications of delegating the fact-finding mission 
to administrative agencies both reflected existing precedent and helped shape the Court’s 
response when the issue finally came to the fore in 1930s.”). 
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Eventually, in the Mann-Elkins Act,129 Congress created the 
Commerce Court, “a specialized Article III tribunal devoted 
exclusively to review of ICC decisions.”130 Professor Merrill notes that 
the Mann-Elkins Act’s passage “arguably ratified—or at least signaled 
[Congress’] strong approval of—the Supreme Court’s newly 
deferential stance toward review of decisions of the ICC.”131 In fact, 
the Commerce Court was eventually disbanded because, among other 
things, the Commerce Court “engaged in very aggressive review of 
ICC decisions.”132 Later manipulation of the appellate review model 
in Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cases—declaring certain issues to 
be issues of law rather than fact, and therefore subject to full review in 
federal courts—prompted Chief Justice Taft to “remind[] his 
colleagues that ‘[they] should scrupulously comply with the evident 
intention of Congress that the Federal Commission be made the fact-
finding body and that the Court should in its rulings preserve the 
Board’s character as such.’”133 Since these formative years, “the 
appellate review model [has become] so thoroughly embedded in 
contemporary administrative law that modern lawyers take it 
for granted.”134 
This brings us to Atlas Roofing, a manifestation of the continuing 
vitality of the appellate review doctrine and the most recent analysis of 
the appellate review doctrine under the Seventh Amendment. In a 
unanimous decision, the Court upheld, against a Seventh Amendment 
challenge, statutorily-prescribed judicial deference to administrative 
fact-finding pertaining to employment law violations.135 In Atlas 
Roofing, an employer appealed the Occupational Safety and Health 
 
 129. Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910). 
 130. Merrill, supra note 105, at 965. 
 131. Id. at 966. 
 132. Id. at 966−67. 
 133. Id. at 971 (quoting FTC v. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U.S. 568, 583 (1923) (Taft, 
C.J.,  doubting)). 
 134. Merrill, supra note 105, at 943; cf. Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern 
Administrative State is Inconsistent with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. 491, 503 (2008) (“The 
proliferation of these administrative agencies . . . starts from the assumption that these agencies 
are a part of the modern constitutional order. Accordingly, the rearguard battle that we have to 
fight today is whether the same kind of judicial discipline applies to the output of administrative 
agencies as it does to the combination of work that follows the usual patterns of Congressional 
legislation and Presidential enforcement.”). 
 135. Justice Blackmun recused himself. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 461 (1977). 
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Review Commission’s determination that the employer’s working 
conditions had breached the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA).136 As required by OSHA,137 when the employers appealed 
the Commission’s determinations to the federal appeals courts, the 
Commission’s factual findings were binding, and the case was never 
submitted to a civil jury for fact-finding.138 The Supreme Court held 
that this administrative fact-finding procedure did not violate the 
Seventh Amendment, on the grounds that cases like this involved 
“statutory public rights” rather than “private rights,” and that civil 
litigation related to “public rights” was not guaranteed a jury trial at 
the common law.139 
This reasoning tracks the second of two theories discussed by 
Professor Merrill that modern scholars attempt to use to reconcile the 
appellate review model with Article III. The first, the “adjunct 
theory,” posits that in cases where the federal courts defer to 
administrative fact-finding, the agencies are essentially “functioning as 
‘adjuncts’ to courts, in a manner analogous to the way juries function 
in trials at law.”140 The second theory (to which the Atlas Roofing 
opinion subscribes) draws a distinction between administrative 
adjudications involving “public rights” and those involving “private 
rights.”141 Under this approach, cases involving private rights may be 
more thoroughly reviewed in federal court, while those involving 
public rights may not.142 
However, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court wrongly 
decided Atlas Roofing because it failed to properly analyze judicial 
deference to administrative fact-finding under the historical test. 
Furthermore, (putting aside the much-maligned historical test), 
trying administrative cases without civil juries contradicts the 
 
 136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78 (2012). 
 137. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (2012) (“The findings of the Commission with respect to 
questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall 
be conclusive.”). 
 138. Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 448. 
 139. Id. at 455–56. 
 140. Merrill, supra note 105, at 981−82. The adjunct theory attracts several important 
criticisms, however, chief among which is the correct observation “that juries . . . have a direct 
basis in the constitutional text, whereas adjudication by federal administrative agencies does not. 
Juries are mentioned both in Article III and in the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 982. 
 141. Id. at 984. 
 142. Id. 
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legislative history behind the Seventh Amendment’s drafting and 
ratification, and therefore fails constitutional scrutiny even outside of 
the Supreme Court’s test. 
B. Deference to Administrative Fact-Finding Fails the Supreme 
Court’s Historical Test 
The settled analysis for whether a given procedure or statute 
violates the Seventh Amendment is the historical test.143 As discussed 
in Section II.B, there are essentially two routes to applying this test. 
To determine whether a specific cause of action requires a jury trial 
right under the historical test, the appellate court must decide whether 
a jury would have been required to dispose of a certain claim under 
the 1791 English common law.144 The second route applies to 
procedures and devices, which must not infringe on the Seventh 
Amendment’s “substance,”145 but may alter or eliminate its “form”146 
or incidents. Therefore, Congress, the executive, and the judiciary are 
free to alter those procedures and characteristics of the jury trial as 
long as they do not interfere with the “substance.” Of course, as 
discussed above, the Supreme Court has never defined exactly what 
constitutes the substance of the Seventh Amendment right, and 
therefore has approved every new procedure or doctrine that litigants 
have claimed to be violations of the Seventh Amendment.147 This 
Comment argues that judicial deference to administrative fact-finding 
in enforcement actions fails the historical test under either route. 
1. Enforcement actions to recover a civil penalty require a jury trial as 
of right 
If we view the issue as a question of whether a specific cause of 
action (in this case, a civil enforcement action) requires a civil jury trial 
right, in-house enforcement actions, and judicial deference to the fact-
finding therein, fail the historical test. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. 
 
 143. See supra Section II.B. 
 144. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 31, at 640 (“If a jury would have been impaneled in 
this kind of case in 1791 English practice, then generally a jury is required by the 
seventh  amendment.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 51, at 147 (citing Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin 
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156−57 (1973)). 
 146. Id. (citing Gasoline Products Co., 283 U.S. at 498). 
 147. Id. 
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Nordberg, the Court divided the cause-of-action route for the 
historical test into two parts: “First, we compare the statutory action 
to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the 
merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the 
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable 
in nature.”148 
As to the first element of the Granfinanciera formulation, 
government actions for recovery of civil penalties fall into the class of 
actions that would have been brought in common law courts, as 
shown by the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. Several scholars have 
argued persuasively that the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789149 is of 
particular relevance when determining the legislative intent behind the 
Seventh Amendment.150 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has said that 
“[t]he Judiciary Act . . . was passed by the first Congress assembled 
under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in 
framing that instrument, and is contemporaneous and weighty 
evidence of its true meaning.”151 Of special relevance to the current 
inquiry is section nine of the Judiciary Act of 1789, stating: 
the district courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of 
all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of 
all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the 
United States. . . . And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, 
in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 
shall be by jury.152 
That the Framers considered it appropriate for cases involving 
“penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United 
States” to be heard by civil juries is powerful evidence that the 
common law presumption was that such cases would be brought in 
common law courts, rather than equity courts.153 Additionally, as the 
 
 148. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Norberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989). 
 149. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 et seq. (1789). 
 150. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 27, at 149−50 (arguing that the Seventh Amendment 
language “shall be preserved” refers to “the compromise already embodied in the Judiciary Act 
[of 1789],” rather than the 1791 English common law). 
 151. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1887). 
 152. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. at 77, § 9(a), (d) (emphasis added). 
 153. See also Brief for Petitioner, Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. 
Comm’n, No. 75-748, 75-746 (1976), 1976 WL 194263 at *17 (“[A] governmental 
proceeding for a civil penalty for violation of a statute would have been triable to a jury, whether 
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petitioners in Atlas Roofing pointed out, the Supreme Court has said 
that “in a just sense, [the Seventh Amendment] may well be construed 
to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, 
whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle 
legal rights.”154 
Regarding the second element of the Granfinanciera formulation 
of the historical test, the remedy sought—a civil penalty—is legal, not 
equitable, by nature. For the purposes of the lawsuit, the civil penalty 
operates as a monetary damages award to the government,155 and as 
every first-year Contracts student learns, a claim for money damages 
was traditionally a claim at common law, not at equity.156 
Therefore, an administrative agency’s lawsuit to recover a civil 
penalty is best viewed as a legal cause of action for which parties to the 
litigation would have a civil jury trial right. On this point, it is 
significant to note that had the claim in Atlas Roofing been brought 
originally in a federal district court, there would have been a right to 
civil jury trial, even though no such right existed when the claim was 
originally brought in an administrative proceeding.157 Whether 
Congress may permissibly assign an administrative agency to 
adjudicate the dispute is a separation-of-powers question that is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. What is highly relevant to the 
Seventh Amendment, however, is how the federal courts treat the 
factual findings of the agency once given the chance to review the 
administrative proceedings. And under the Seventh Amendment’s 
historical test, viewing enforcement actions as a claim for money 
damages presents serious constitutional issues when Article III courts 
defer to administrative fact-finding. 
 
the proceeding was brought by a representative of the Crown or by an informer on behalf of 
the Crown.”). 
 154. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at *23 (emphasis added). 
 155. Id. at *17. 
 156. See, e.g., 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 32 (“In general, equity does not have jurisdiction 
in cases in which the remedy sought is the recovery of money, whether as collection on a debt 
or as damages. Actions to recover money are generally considered actions at law.”). 
 157. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at *17. The Supreme Court has held, however, 
that where the rights being adjudicated are “private rights” rather than “public rights,” the 
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial may still apply even to administrative proceedings. Mark 
I. Greenberg, The Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Courts and Administrative Agencies 
after Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 479 (1990) (discussing 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)). 
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2. Judicial deference infringes on the jury trial right’s substance 
Coming at the historical test from the second approach 
(substance-versus-incidents), the historical test demands that the 
procedural rules governing deference not infringe on the actual 
“substance” of the Seventh Amendment right. Therefore, we must 
first define the substance of the civil jury trial right, for which 
definition we turn to Professor Thomas.158  
a. The jury finds facts. First, “the jury or the parties determined 
the facts.”159 This was accomplished either through a jury trial, or 
through the parties stipulating to a certain version of the facts; the 
judge “never decided the case without such a determination by the 
jury or the parties, however improbable the evidence might be.”160 
Additionally, “a jury would decide every case in which there was any 
evidence, however improbable the evidence was, unless the moving 
party admitted the facts and conclusions of the nonmoving party.”161 
Under these principles, a Seventh Amendment challenge to 
judicial deference seems to be an easy case. The Supreme Court has 
said that the Seventh Amendment preserves the civil jury right’s 
“substance,” and, as Professor Thomas has argued, the substance is 
the principle that “the jury or the parties determined the facts.”162 To 
have an arm of the executive branch effectively predetermine the facts 
in a federal judicial proceeding obviously violates this principle,163 and 
should therefore be held unconstitutional under the historical test’s 
“substance” approach. 
Judicial deference also falls short of satisfying the second 
“substance” principle applicable here—that “a jury would decide 
every case in which there was any evidence, however improbable the 
 
 158. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 
139  (2007). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. In the technical sense that the entity adjudicating an administrative proceeding is also 
ultimately the same entity prosecuting the claim, one could argue that the parties have 
determined the facts where deference is given to administrative fact-finding. However, allowing 
an executive arm of the government to determine the facts of a dispute clearly defeats the 
legislative history of the Seventh Amendment, discussed below in Section IV.C. 
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evidence was.”164 Conversely, under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), the general rule, where formal adjudication occurs, is that the 
administrative body will take evidence165 and make factual findings,166 
and any federal court eventually reviewing administrative 
adjudications will “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by 
substantial evidence.”167 
Consider a hypothetical: the fictional Federal Eggs and Cheese 
Commission initiates administrative proceedings against a dairy farmer 
to assess a civil penalty for violating a National Cheese Curd Quality 
Act. In the resulting administrative adjudication, the farmer presents 
evidence that the she is compliant with the statutory requirements. As 
long as the Eggs and Cheese Commission can martial “substantial 
evidence” that the farmer is not in compliance with the statute, the 
Commission may find against the dairy farmer, and those findings will 
not be disturbed upon judicial review of the proceedings—even 
though this is essentially a question of judgment that could go either 
way.168 For administrative fact-finding to bind the reviewing court 
except where the fact-finding is so outrageous as to be “unsupported 
by substantial evidence” constitutes a wholesale displacement of the 
civil jury trial right, which required that “a jury would decide every 
case in which there was any evidence.”169 
b. The public-right/private-right fiction. A final point: the public-
right/private-right dichotomy that determined the outcomes in both 
Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera did not even exist in 1791 English 
common law,170 and therefore should not be the deciding factor for a 
 
 164. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 
143 (2007). 
 165. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012). 
 166. § 557(c) (“The record shall show the ruling on each finding, conclusion, or exception 
presented. All decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative decisions, are a part of 
the record and shall include a statement of—(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or 
basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and 
(B) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.”). 
 167. § 706(2)(E). 
 168. This is similar to the “abuse-of-discretion” standard of review for reviewing trial 
judge’s discretionary actions; the question is not whether the trial judge made the best decision, 
but rather only whether the trial judge’s decision was rational. 
 169. Thomas, supra note 164, at 143 (emphasis added). 
 170. “The public rights rule had to be created to decide the Atlas [Roofing] case; it is not 
the holding of any earlier opinion.” Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: 
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right that, according to the historical test, is based on 1791 English 
jurisprudence. To reach this public rights exception, the Supreme 
Court falsely analogized common law tax proceedings, which were 
executive actions, to civil penalty enforcement actions.171 In fact, no 
such power existed outside the realm of tariffs and internal 
revenue proceedings.172 
At any rate, the public-right/private-right distinction is simply not 
a sturdy deciding factor on which to base the enjoyment of 
constitutional rights.173 For example, the Court in Atlas Roofing 
maintained that no jury trial was required because the Occupational 
Safety and Health Commission was enforcing public rights, rather 
than private rights.174 This is true, in the sense that the Commission 
was enforcing worker safety standards, grounded in congressionally 
approved public policy, against employers who might take advantage 
of such workers. In other words, as the Supreme Court said in 
 
The Supreme Court’s Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1287 (1977); 
Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s Assault on the 
Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1293−311 (1977) (declaring that “there is no 
evidence that anyone in 1791 understood there was such an open-ended exception [as the public 
rights exception]” and saying that the Court’s discussion of this right is based on a “misuse of 
precedent”); Joseph Czerwien, Note, Preserving the Civil Jury Right: Reconsidering the Scope of 
the Seventh Amendment, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 429, 430 (2014) (arguing that “[t]his ‘public 
rights exception’ is inconsistent with the amendment’s purpose”); id. at 448 n.130 (citing 
Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial In Non-Article 
III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
407 (1995) (criticizing the public rights exception)). 
 171. Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s 
Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1299−305, 1311−28 (1977) 
(calling the majority opinion “a clear example of misuse of precedent”). 
 172. Id. at 1299 (calling the majority opinion “a clear example of misuse of precedent”). 
 173. “The term ‘public rights’ was coined in the mid-nineteenth century to describe a class 
of rights, disputes over which could be conclusively resolved by the executive or legislative 
branches of the federal government, without participation by the judiciary. Thus, causes of action 
involving public rights do not necessarily enjoy adjudication by a judge whose independence is 
guaranteed by Article III. But it is not clear why such causes of action should also be free of the 
commands of the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never provided a 
workable definition of public rights.” Mark I. Greenberg, The Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article 
III Courts and Administrative Agencies after Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 479, 481 (1990) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has said that “[t]he distinction 
between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents. 
Nor is it necessary to do so in the present cases . . . .” Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982). 
 174. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 
450 (1977). 
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Granfinanciera, “a public right [is] a statutory right closely 
intertwined with a federal regulatory scheme.”175 
However, the Commission’s actions, while “closely intertwined 
with a federal regulatory scheme,” also heavily implicate what are 
(outside of administrative law) generally considered private rights. For 
example, the employers were fined for violating civil laws and 
therefore deprived of their financial resources.176 Together, the two 
employers in Atlas were fined $5,935 for OSHA violations177—
$23,588.49 in 2016 dollars. And it seems absurd, with respect to both 
the common law in 1791,178 and the legislative history discussed below 
in Section IV.B, that the employers would be entitled to a jury trial 
under the Seventh Amendment only if the party seeking to exact 
$5,935 were another private individual rather than the federal 
Leviathan.179 Since the Framers viewed the Seventh Amendment, as 
with the rest of the Bill of Rights, as a protection against 
government,180 at the very least we should allow the “historical test” 
to be slightly more historically informed. Consider this statement by 
the preeminent English legal mind, William Blackstone: 
Every new tribunal erected for the decision of facts, without the 
intervention of a jury, (whether composed of justices of the peace, 
commissioners of the revenue, judges of a court of conscience, or 
 
 175. Czerwien, supra note 170, at 448 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 
33, 54−55 (1989) and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (affirming this model 
of public rights)). 
 176. Criticizing the SEC’s use of administrative law judges, Professor Ronald J. Riccio said 
that “[t]here’s no reason not to have an independent corps of hearing examiners . . . . When you 
look at what’s at stake—a person’s livelihood—why should that be subjected to second-class due 
process?”  Morgenson, supra note 6. 
 177. Atlas Roofing Co., 3 OSAHRC 19, at *7 (No. 1130, 1973) ($600 penalty); Frank 
Irey, Jr., Inc., 4 OSAHRC 1, at *17−18 (No. 701, 1973) ($5,335 penalty). 
 178. This even seems to violate ideas as old, for instance, as Magna Carta’s provision that 
“No freeman is to be . . . disseised of his free tenement or of his liberties or free customs, . . . 
save by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA cl. 29 (1215). 
 179. This seems roughly analogous to denying a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial 
because the prosecutor is merely ‘enforcing public rights.’ In fact, the proposition of denying 
the right to a jury trial in a criminal case seems ridiculous because of the Sixth Amendment. Why 
should the same deprivation seem less ridiculous in administrative enforcement proceedings, 
given the Seventh Amendment? 
 180. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Liberty Through Limits: The Bill of Rights as Limited 
Government Provisions, 62 S.M.U. L. REV. 1745 (Fall 2009). 
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any other standing magistrates) is a step towards establishing . . . the 
most oppressive of absolute governments.181 
Measured against these principles, judicial deference to 
administrative fact-finding impermissibly violates the substance of the 
Seventh Amendment right. In fact, deference seems to fit well within 
Justice Marshall’s language in his Colgrove v. Battin dissent: judicial 
deference to administrative fact-finding constitutes “wholesale 
abolition and replacement [of the jury] with a different institution 
which functions differently, produces different results, and was wholly 
unknown to the Framers of the Seventh Amendment.”182 
C. Deference to Administrative Fact-Finding is Contrary to the 
Seventh Amendment’s “Legislative History” 
Setting aside the criticized historical test (as many have suggested 
the Supreme Court do),183 scholars have shown that the legislative 
history of the Seventh Amendment condemns in-house enforcement 
actions and judicial deference to administrative fact-finding even more 
harshly.184 Recall that the ratification debate was a Herculean political 
 
 181. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 380 (1768). 
 182. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 166−67 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 183. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 26, at 148. (“The problem with the Supreme Court’s 
historical test is that it is based on a fundamental misconception about the purposes of the 
Seventh Amendment. In other words, to ponder whether English courts in 1791 would have 
tried a particular cause of action to a jury is to ask the wrong question. This is because the 
historical test is entirely without warrant in the historical record.”); JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY 
JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES (2006) (criticizing 
the historical test and arguing for a more fluid, modern approach); Wolfram, supra note 28, at 
731, 747 (“That such an accident of history should continue to control application of the 
seventh amendment would be justifiable only if there were available no other principled reading 
of the amendment. . . . Perhaps it is too late for wholesale abandonment of the historical test, a 
relatively firmly imbedded part of the law for over a century and a half. But recent musings of 
the Supreme Court suggest that a re-thinking of the historical test might not be precluded by 
stare decisis. If precedent is not an insurmountable obstacle, then one may hope that the time is 
near when the dead hand of the historical test will be lifted from the seventh amendment.”); 
Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury 
Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1007 (1992) (“It is time to end this charade. The sooner we 
confess that both as a matter of original intent and subsequent evolution, the Seventh 
Amendment is not what we have made of it, the sooner our legal system will address the task of 
defining civil jury rights in a way that is philosophically and jurisprudentially sound.”). But see 
Czerwien, supra note 170, at 430 (“This Note argues that the Court’s historical test is in keeping 
with the amendment’s scope and purpose.”). 
 184.  Klein, supra note 37; Harrington, supra note 26; Scheiner, supra note 23. 
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struggle between the Federalists who saw strong national government 
as a stabilizing force for the fledgling nation, and the Antifederalists, 
who saw strong national government as a threat to state government 
and individual liberties.185 The Federalists’ arguments carried the day 
overall—the new Constitution was ratified and implemented—but the 
Antifederalists forced some very important concessions. One of these 
concessions was a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the right to 
civil jury.186 Indeed, “[t]he Antifederalist attitudes provide a relevant 
position from which to negotiate with the insistent demands of 
hierarchy, technocracy and the administrative state,”187 and the 
Seventh Amendment is best interpreted by reference to the 
Antifederalist position.188 
One of the strongest and most common arguments the 
Antifederalists put forth in favor of an explicit civil jury guarantee was 
that the civil jury trial acts as a democratic check on governmental 
tyranny. The American colonists despised that King George III had 
authorized the vice-admiralty courts (which heard cases with no civil 
jury) to enforce civil penalties against colonial subjects.189 To allow an 
arm of the federal government to effectively predetermine facts in 
federal judicial proceedings is to revive vestiges of the very supposed 
 
 185. See, e.g., Federalist & Antifederalist Positions, POLYTECHNIC SCH., 
http://faculty.polytechnic.org/gfeldmeth/chart.fed.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2016). 
 186. One more general matter should be emphasized concerning the debate between 
the supporters of the proposed Constitution and the antifederalists who unsuccessfully 
attempted to prevent its adoption: on the matter of civil jury trial the antifederalists 
won. While many of their arguments concerning the form of the national government 
and the extent of its power were ultimately rejected, the antifederalist arguments 
concerning civil jury trial (and other guarantees that were enacted into the Bill of 
Rights) ultimately prevailed.  
Wolfram, supra note 28, at 672; see supra Section II.A. 
 187. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 148. 
 188. Id. (“Any attempt to create a vital civil jury trial right should be informed by the 
rhetoric of those who fought for its preservation, and won that fight—primarily, the 
Antifederalists. This is not to say that the ‘original understanding’ of the seventh amendment 
must define its current contours, or that discovery of such an understanding is practicable or 
possible. Antifederalist rhetoric does not offer definitions, but attitudes—suspicion toward 
judicial power, fear that the government will serve the few against the many, and respect for the 
civil jury as the last bulwark against oligarchy and the last redoubt of self-government.”); see also 
Wolfram, supra note 28, at 672−73. 
 189. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 26. 
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tyranny that the colonists fought to abolish in the 
Revolutionary War.190 
In fact, among the Antifederalists’ justifications for demanding a 
civil jury trial right was “protection against abuse by government 
officials”191 and “protection against biased or corrupt judges.”192 This 
argument is of particular relevance with regard to the relationship 
between Article III courts and administrative agencies, because in 
administrative adjudications, the potentially biased and abusive 
government officials are the judges—the ALJs—who hear the dispute. 
This is not an insubstantial possibility, given well-founded concerns 
about the neutrality and unfairness of ALJs and administrative 
proceedings generally.193 The SEC’s ALJs, for example, have been 
 
 190. A far more immediate concern, however, was the fear that the national 
government would utilize its legislative power to oppress the citizenry. Without specific 
protection for the jury, antifederalists argued, Congress might enact tax or revenue 
statutes that allowed a customs or excise officer to prosecute violations in federal courts 
without juries. Such an argument, of course, rekindled all the old complaints about the 
colonial vice-admiralty courts. 
Id. at 186. 
   191. Id. at 185. 
 192. Id. at 187; see also Wolfram, supra note 29, at 670−71; Scheiner, supra note 23, at 
148, 150 (listing aspects of the antifederalist “conception of the role of the civil jury,” which 
include the civil jury as a “bulwark against ministerial tyranny,” and to “offset judicial bias in 
favor of the government”). 
 193.   Administrative agencies exist to promote efficiency in government. Despite the 
utility of administrative proceedings, the importance and necessity of administrative 
tribunals must also be examined in light of the atavistic concern the agency has in the 
outcome of each case before them. Administrators, whose function includes 
administering and implementing a stated legislative purpose, make administrative 
determinations, not judges. Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), therefore, do not adopt 
the judicial attitude of impartiality, but ‘rather the attitude of an executive who wants 
to get a job done.’ Every search for the truth, and every effort at compensating the 
wronged party must be tempered toward accomplishing the agency’s legislative charter. 
To this end, some agencies have evidenced everything from antipathy to outright 
discouragement of participation by outside counsel. Simply put, agencies are parties to 
the very proceedings they conduct. 
Heather Rutland, Civil Rights Are Civil Rights Are Civil Rights: The Inapplicability of Preclusion 
to Unreviewed State Administrative Decisions, 20 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 199, 
201−02 (2000); see also Elaine Golin, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in 
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1532 (1995); Jason D. Vendel, Note, General 
Bias and Administrative Law Judges: Is There a Remedy for Social Security Disability Claimants?, 
90 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 770 (2005) (“Even though the regulations provide ALJs with 
standards by which to evaluate claims, few will deny that bias inevitably seeps into their decision-
making process. With some ALJs, however, bias more than seeps. It gushes. From racial, gender, 
and class prejudice to bias against disability claimants in general, ALJs might possess—and exhibit 
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criticized for being unfair to defendants.194 To be faithful to the spirit 
in which the Seventh Amendment was ratified, the Seventh 
Amendment must be interpreted so as to provide jury protection from 
the federal government. 
Furthermore, if the Antifederalist position is any guide, the jury 
trial right was intended to extend to civil enforcement actions. There 
is evidence that the Antifederalists who ultimately drove the Seventh 
Amendment’s passage195 believed 
that the jury was essential in cases involving suits between a citizen 
and the national government as well as suits brought by the 
government under the revenue laws. While the criminal jury 
remained the most obvious protection against an oppressive 
prosecution, the civil jury remained, they said, an essential weapon 
against arbitrary enforcement of the government’s laws. A citizen’s 
right to sue the officers of the government for violations of his rights 
was a nullity without the right to put the case to a jury of his peers.196 
In a civil enforcement action like Atlas Roofing or post-Dodd-
Frank SEC proceedings, this argument is most potent because the 
government itself is directly levying the weight of the federal 
government against the employer.197 Indeed, 
 
in their decisions—any viewpoint extant in the world. In some cases, the manifestations of such 
biases would dismay even the most ardent advocates of judicial discretion, prompting the 
question of how to remedy such bias. And in such a case, an aggrieved Social Security disability 
claimant may be greatly disappointed as his lawyers are confronted with a procedural and 
evidentiary nightmare.”); Epstein, supra note 134, at 492−93 (“[E]xpertise [in administrative 
agencies] is an overrated virtue, while the risk of political capture by interest groups and the 
discord that faction produces is an underappreciated vice.”). 
 194. Ryan, supra note 5; Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-
spotlight-1448236970. 
 195. “Since the antifederalists were the generative force behind the seventh amendment, it 
seems that their arguments should be given due weight in determining the purpose behind the 
seventh amendment and should be resorted to as an aid in resolving interpretative problems that 
arise under its language.” Wolfram, supra note 28, at 672−73. 
 196. Harrington, supra note 26, at 185; see also Wolfram, supra 28, at 670–71 (asserting 
that one of the purposes of the Seventh Amendment, to the Antifederalists, was “the vindication 
of the interests of private citizens in litigation with the government”). 
 197. Professor Wolfram notes that “[a]nother important function of the civil jury, 
according to the antifederalists, was to provide the common citizen with a sympathetic forum in 
suits against the government.” Wolfram, supra note 28, at 708. Surely this same reasoning applies 
with extra vigor when the government is targeting the private individual. 
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[f]or the Antifederalists, the civil jury would play a duel role in the 
new Republic: it would protect the common people against the judges’ 
biases in favor of the government and the private ruling class, and also 
establish a small preserve of direct self-government in the face of the 
remote Federal regime.198  
If the executive branch’s factual determinations are practically final 
and conclusive, then the employer is left with little protection indeed 
against the possibility of a vindictive and abusive governmental 
enforcement—which was the Antifederalists’ darkest fear. 
Furthermore, responding to the Federalist argument “that 
criminal juries [alone] were sufficient to guard against tyranny,”199 an 
idea still in currency today, one Antifederalist wrote: 
Are there not a thousand civil cases in which the government is a 
party?—In all actions for penalties, forfeitures and public debts, as 
well as many others, the government is a party and the whole weight 
of government is thrown into the scale of the prosecution[,] yet 
these are all of them civil causes. . . . These modes of harassing the 
subject have perhaps been more effectual than direct 
criminal prosecutions.200 
Ultimately, even if allowing administrative agencies to adjudicate 
disputes does not violate the constitutional principle of separation-of-
powers, such proceedings are independently unconstitutional for 
other reasons. The lack of civil jury right in such proceedings, and the 
limitations on federal judge review of administrative fact-finding, 
creates serious Seventh Amendment problems when considered 
against the legislative history and Antifederalist roots of the 
Amendment. The Antifederalists saw the civil jury trial largely as a 
substantive protection against the federal government, and specifically 
envisioned that such a right would exist in cases between the federal 
government and private citizens. 
 
 198. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 144 (emphasis added). SEC enforcement cases add a little 
historical irony to this perspective, since those securities traders against whom the SEC brings 
enforcement actions are often grouped into “the private ruling class” that corrupt judges 
would favor. 
 199. Id. at 151. 
 200. Id., citing 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 28 (Hebert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
However, “[n]ot all of those who supported the civil jury . . . may have intended that it be 
guaranteed in cases involving the government as a party.” Scheiner, supra note 23, at 151 n.46. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing ruled that judicial deference 
to administrative fact-finding is constitutional under the Seventh 
Amendment.201 The Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing was also wrong. 
Neither Congress nor the judiciary may simply ignore the 
constitutional problems presented by jury-less trials before ALJs in 
civil enforcement actions, or by judicial deference to administrative 
fact-finding.  
The legal community is not blind to the serious problems with the 
civil jury. Critics complain that much legal analysis surpasses the 
average juror’s comprehension.202 Jury trials are expensive for 
everyone involved—including the judiciary, which must provide 
meals, lodging, and per diem payment for each juror.203 Furthermore, 
federal district courts are already overworked as it is.204 Nevertheless, 
the pros and cons of the civil jury are ultimately a policy question, and 
it is a policy question that the United States settled in 1792 when the 
Seventh Amendment was ratified. If our country wants to revisit that 
question, it must do so by passing a constitutional amendment. 
Whether under the Supreme Court’s flawed historical test or the 
alternative legislative history analysis, the practice of deferring to 
administrative fact-finding in Article III federal courts is an 
infringement of the civil jury trial right enshrined in the Seventh 
Amendment. And simply ignoring a portion of the Constitution, or 
pretending that contradictions between labyrinthine jurisprudence 
 
 201. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S. 
442  (1977). 
 202. See, e.g., Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE L.J. 
1155 (May 1980); Alan Reifman, Spencer M. Gusick, & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Real Jurors’ 
Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 539 (Oct. 1992); Erin Fuchs, 
This Is Why Juries Shouldn’t Decide Court Cases, BUS. INSIDER (July 3, 2014, 1:36 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/america-should-get-rid-of-the-jury-trial-2014-7. 
 203. Fuchs, supra note 202. 
 204. See, e.g., Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and 
Wondering Where Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015, 2:15 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courts-
vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b.s; Overloaded Courts, Not Enough Judges: The 
Impact on Real People, PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, http://www.pfaw.org/sites/default/
files/lower_federal_courts.pdf (citing Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-civil-
cases-pile-up-1428343746; Alicia Bannon, Testimony: More Judges Needed in Federal Courts, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/
testimony-federal-courts-need-more-judges. 
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and the apparent meaning of the constitutional text do not exist, only 
serves to: compound the problem; lessen respect for the judiciary; and 
cheapen the integrity of the other clauses of the Constitution. 
Broadly speaking, there are two possible solutions to the problem. 
The first option is to bring the Constitution in line with the 
administrative state, through a formal amendment to the Constitution 
in order to allow for jury-less administrative proceedings. The second 
option is to bring the administrative state in line with the 
Constitutional text, probably through amendments to the APA and 
other administrative statutes. Both options have merit, and ultimately 
will need to be decided in a detailed policy debate at the national level. 
But one option must be chosen. The most historically justifiable 
choice would be to require the SEC, and all similar administrative 
agencies, to bring enforcement actions in an Article III court in the 
first instance. Multiple avenues (some better than others) could 
initiate this change: the Supreme Court could bring its case law more 
in line with historical understanding of the civil jury trial right; 
Congress could amend the APA and the SEC’s organic statute; even 
the SEC could change its policy, to voluntarily discontinue bringing 
enforcement actions before in-house tribunals. There, of course, 
practical and logistical issues that would follow such a change, but 
surely protection of liberty (safeguarded by the civil jury) must 
outweigh efficiency concerns. Players in each of the three branches 
have the power to solve the problem, even if only temporarily. 
The longer the legal world pretends this problem does not exist, 
the harder it will be to remedy the issue and establish a consistent legal 
landscape in the future.205 As we have seen, one hundred years of 
administrative law has already ossified the judicial deference doctrine; 
we must not let it go further. At some point, someone needs to point 
out that the emperor has no clothes. 
 
John Gibbons∗ 
206 
  
 
 205.  Klein, supra note 37, at 1007 (“It is time to end this charade. The sooner we confess 
that both as a matter of original intent and subsequent evolution, the Seventh Amendment is 
not what we have made of it, the sooner our legal system will address the task of defining civil 
jury rights in a way that is philosophically and jurisprudentially sound.”). 
∗ J.D. candidate, April 2017, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.   
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